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4 December 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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


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***Finland:** President Kekkonen believes that Soviet pressures since 30 October are directed primarily against NATO and Sweden rather than Finland and reflect the general deterioration of the world situation. In a conversation with Ambassador Gufler, Kekkonen said he made no political commitments with regard to internal Finnish affairs and did not agree to sign a separate peace treaty with or recognize the East German regime. He stated that Khrushchev had not brought up any of these matters.

Kekkonen sought to interpret some parts of the 25 November Khrushchev-Kekkonen communiqué as a victory for Finland. Kekkonen said that the communiqué implied acceptance of Finland's view that both countries must agree a threat exists before military consultations can be initiated. Kekkonen believes that, in the event of a military threat in the Baltic area, the communiqué gives Finland rather than Moscow the responsibility for initiating consultations. Ambassador Gufler, however, considers Kekkonen's interpretation of this point as unrealistic and possibly an effort to avoid admitting that Finland made a major concession to the USSR.

Ambassador Gufler also believes that the Soviet pressure on Finland may reflect Moscow's concern over the economic and eventual military power of an integrated Western Europe into which even the European neutrals might be drawn.

Congo: Antagonism between UN and Katangan forces in Elisabethville has increased following the 2 December arrest of 31 Katangan gendarmes by Indian troops after a reported

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half-hour fire fight near the Elisabethville airport. The US consul notes that UN military officers and men are urging their civilian superiors to authorize direct action against Tshombé's forces. Bloody clashes could develop if the Indian major, missing since 28 November, is found dead.

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Tshombé, who told Senator Dodd on 29 November that he was willing to meet with Adoula, but not at Leopoldville, arrived in Paris on 3 December. There is as yet no firm evidence that he attempted to contact the Leopoldville government during his two-day stopover in Brazzaville.

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Dominican Republic: The political stalemate continues, although public pressure is mounting for a resumption of negotiations between President Balaguer and opposition leaders on the formation of a coalition government. The leading opposition group, the National Civic Union (UCN), appears rent by a struggle between a moderate faction anxious to resume negotiations and intransigents willing to negotiate only on the basis of Balaguer's resignation.

General Rafael Rodriguez Echevarria, armed forces leader, has not yet imposed his "solution," which calls for a two-year military-dominated regime headed by Balaguer. Balaguer has publicly accepted the military proposal but told the American consul general privately that he considered it a less desirable solution than one stemming from an agreement with the UCN. While continuation of the impasse further embitters the military leaders against the UCN and reduces the chances of their early acceptance of an opposition-led regime, the continued stalemate also aggravates military disunity, thus weakening current military leadership. A group of air force officers announced their resignations on 2 December and publicly criticized Rodriguez as a "military dictator." This action will encourage UCN intransigents, who arranged for the dissident officers' press interview and who have claimed support for their position in the military.

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[REDACTED]

Turkey: The ending of 18 months of martial law and the vote of confidence given the new coalition government on 2 December will allow Premier Ismet Inonu to try to re-establish civilian parliamentary government. The government's margin in the vote of confidence, 269 of 450 seats, rested on the 170 votes of Inonu's Republican People's party plus a majority of the deputies of the Justice party, whose rank and file bitterly oppose the RPP.

How long the present arrangement will last is uncertain. The moderate leadership of the Justice party agreed to participate in a coalition with the RPP only under pressure from the military junta, which made it clear that the alternative to such a coalition was continued rule by the military. Thus, if the new government proves unable to handle its complex problems effectively or if the military considers its interests are jeopardized, another military takeover is likely to occur. [REDACTED]

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Common Market: The Common Market (EEC) countries may be heading for an early showdown on their increasingly divisive dispute over the further political development of the EEC. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak has informed Ambassador MacArthur he will insist that the EEC foreign ministers "thrash out" at their 10 December meeting the fundamental issues posed by De Gaulle's draft treaty for a loose European confederation and

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[redacted] by the prospective entry into the EEC of additional countries which may not accept the Common Market's political objectives. Spaak fears that these issues, unless resolved, could mean the "death knell of European political unification." [redacted]

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*USSR: The Izvestia editorial of 3 December constitutes Moscow's first authoritative response to President Kennedy's interview with Aleksei I. Adzhubei. Although Izvestia conceded that the President had put forward "quite a few reasonable ideas," the generally querulous tone of the editorial seems to reflect the Soviet leaders' dissatisfaction with the outcome of this venture and underlines their sensitivity to some of the issues the President raised, such as the USSR's efforts to communize the entire world and the status of the countries of Eastern Europe.

The strong language employed in rejecting the concept of an international administration on the autobahn linking West Berlin with West Germany probably was intended to discourage the Western powers from introducing any formal proposals along these lines. Izvestia termed this concept a "worsened version of the occupation rights" in West Berlin which, it said, the US intends to "expand by infringing on the rights" of the East German regime. "Such plans," said Izvestia, "are doomed to failure."

The editorial portrayed the President's remarks regarding an arrangement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as an "intention" to "reach agreement on a NATO commitment to live in peace with the Warsaw Pact nations." Izvestia also stated that "we can acclaim the President's commitment" not to transfer nuclear weapons to any country and his remark that he would be reluctant to see West Germany acquire a nuclear capacity of its own. Izvestia's effort to establish US "commitments" on these issues suggests that the USSR will seek to develop this line in any negotiations on Berlin and Germany. [redacted]

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[redacted] 25X1

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Situation in the Congo

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[redacted] The US consul reports that the UN military appear obsessed with the idea that white mercenaries are attempting to provoke a UN attack on Katangan forces, in the hope that the UN force would be defeated in the ensuing fighting. The US Consulate has no firm evidence, however, that mercenaries have been involved in recent Katangan attacks on UN personnel.

[redacted] The disappearance of the Indian major, who was popular with his troops, has aroused bitter resentment among the UN military in Elisabethville. [redacted] Indian troops are on the verge of attacking Katangan forces despite the restraining order from UN headquarters in Elisabethville. Although the Katangan government appears to be cooperating

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Tshombé's stay in Brazzaville was surrounded with great secrecy. The US Embassy reports that he was met at the airport by President Youlou and Vice President Opangault, with whom he quickly left and drove to the presidential palace. Tshombé made no statement to newsmen either on his arrival or departure. Tshombé, now in Paris, had been expected to go to Rio de Janeiro to attend a Moral Rearmament conference, but this trip has reportedly been cancelled. [redacted]

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France-Algeria

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The American Embassy in Paris comments that the increased defiance of the government by rightists in France suggests a growing belief that the OAS can defeat De Gaulle's Algerian policy. The embassy noted, however, that rightists' hopes in metropolitan France are linked to the chances of the OAS in Algeria, the only place where the outcome can really be decided.

Meanwhile, the major cities of Algeria continue to be racked by inter-racial violence. PAG spokesmen in Tunis and at the UN have strongly protested European mob attacks on Moslems, alleging that the French security forces have tacitly condoned such actions. The PAG last week reportedly met to consider the political significance of these attacks, and it will probably be sensitive on the matter in view of its effort to strengthen its authority over urban Moslems in Algeria.

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Dispute Over EEC Political Ties May Be Approaching Showdown

Adamant Belgian and Dutch opposition to De Gaulle's plan forced the cancellation of last week's meeting of the committee working on the treaty for a political union of the EEC countries, and Spaak himself took the initiative in calling for a meeting of foreign ministers. Brussels and The Hague differ in their objections to the French draft treaty, but, partly in order to prevent an early agreement, they have joined in insisting that Britain be brought into the talks at this stage. West Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg--although favoring a stronger union than that proposed by De Gaulle--have endorsed the French approach and, like Paris, hope the treaty can be signed by January.

From Spaak's remarks to MacArthur on 28 November, it is evident that his opposition to the French treaty--which he described as "actually retrogressive"--is fundamental. Spaak explained that at present the EEC treaty with its supranational features is "the bible" for European political unification. If the French treaty is pushed through, it will become "the bible," Spaak said, and subsequent efforts to move toward real political unification will be countered by the argument that the French treaty has modified the EEC treaty.

Spaak appears especially fearful that the confederation approach would play into the hands of prospective new members or associates of the EEC who desire to participate in the EEC's economic and commercial advantages but do not accept its political objectives. He has heretofore indicated some skepticism that Britain fully shares these objectives, and he is concerned lest the prospective association of the neutral states--Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria--have the effect of permanently braking the political development of the EEC. These three countries have been considering applying formally about mid-December for EEC association, conditional on exemptions designed to "protect" their neutrality.

As an architect of the EEC treaty, Spaak retains considerable influence in EEC circles, but it is difficult to say whether

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